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Abstract. In this paper, we generalise recent work on reconstructing
an agent’s epistemic state from observations about what it believed after
receiving a series of revision inputs. We do so by also allowing to take
into account information about what the agent did not believe after each
revision step.
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1 Introduction
The problem of belief revision, i.e., of how an agent should modify its beliefs
about the world given some new information which possibly contradicts its cur-
rent beliefs, is by now a well-established research area in AI [7]. Traditionally, the
work in this area is done from the agent’s perspective, being usually pre-occupied
with constructing actual revision operators which the agent might use and with
rationality postulates which constrain how these operators should behave. In [2]
we proposed to change the viewpoint and to cast ourselves in the role of an
observer of the agent.
The scenario there is as follows. We are given some sequence (φ1, . . . , φn)
of revision inputs which a particular agent, hereafter A, has received over a
certain length of time and we are also given a sequence (θ1, . . . , θn) with the
interpretation that following the ith input φi, A believed (at least) θi. We make
the assumptions that A received no input between φ1 and φn other than those
listed, and that the θi are correct (but possibly partial) descriptions of A’s beliefs
after each input. We are interested in trying to guess, on the basis of these two
sequences, what the agent believed before receiving the first input φ1, after each
input φi (i ≤ n) and after a possible further input φn+1.
In this paper, we generalise this scenario. In addition to the inputs φi the
agent received and information θi about what the agent believed afterwards, we
will allow information about what the agent did not believe after receiving φi.
It should be clear that it is not always possible to express this using a single
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sentence, if we think of believing neither p nor ¬p, for example. Hence, this
additional information is encoded as a set of sentences rather than a sentence.
So, an observation o = 〈(φ1, . . . , φn), (θ1, . . . , θn), (D1, . . . , Dn)〉 will contain
a third sequence (D1, . . . , Dn), each Di being a (finite) set of sentences. The
interpretation of an observation is that after receiving the first i inputs φ1, . . . , φi,
A believes θi but does not believe any δ ∈ Di. The observations considered in
[2] basically were special cases where Di = ∅ for all i. In fact, most of the results
presented in this paper subsume the corresponding results in [2].
Having no access to the agent’s internals, we assume a belief revision frame-
work A uses for determining its beliefs and for incorporating new information,
and construct a model of A that explains the observation about it. By consid-
ering this model, we will then be able to make extra inferences or predictions
about A’s epistemic behaviour. We restrict the investigation to the special case
of a framework for iterated non-prioritised revision, i.e., revision in which the
new input is not necessarily always believed after revision, that has been studied
in [1]. The idea behind it is that an agent’s epistemic state is made up of two
components: (i) a sequence ρ of sentences representing the sequence of revision
inputs the agent has received thus far, and (ii) a single sentence N standing for
the agent’s set of core beliefs, which intuitively are those beliefs of the agent it
considers “untouchable”. The agent’s full set of beliefs in the state [ρ,N] is then
determined by a particular calculation on ρ and N, while new revision inputs
are incorporated by simply appending them to the end of ρ. The choice of this
framework does not imply that others are less worthy of investigation. The chal-
lenge now becomes to find that particular model of this form which best explains
the observation o = 〈(φ1, . . . , φn), (θ1, . . . , θn), (D1, . . . , Dn)〉 we have made of
A.
We assume sentences φi, θi, λ, δ,N, etc. are elements of some finitely-genera-
ted propositional language L. In our examples, p, q, r, s denote distinct propo-
sitional variables. The classical logical entailment relation between sentences is
denoted by `, while ≡ denotes classical logical equivalence. Wherever we use a
sentence to describe a belief set the intention is that it represents all its logical
consequences. The operation · on sequences denotes sequence concatenation. Let
O±n be the set of all observations o = 〈(φ1, . . . , φn), (θ1, . . . , θn), (D1, . . . , Dn)〉
of length n. We denote by O± =
⋃
O±i the set of all possible observations. We
denote by O the subset of O± where Di = ∅ for all i, i.e. those observations that
contain no information about what is not believed after a revision step. Note
that this is the set considered in [2].
In Section 2 we will explain the model of the agent which we assume through-
out the paper. The problem will be formally defined and solved in Section 3. We
conclude with some discussion in Section 4.
2 Modelling the Agent
As indicated in the introduction, we follow [1] by assuming that, at any given
moment in time, an agent’s epistemic state is represented by a pair [ρ,N]. ([9,11]
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also use sequences to represent epistemic states, but without core beliefs). In
order to fully specify the agent’s epistemic processes, we also need to formally
specify (i) how the agent determines its set of beliefs Bel([ρ,N]) in any given
state [ρ,N], and (ii) how it incorporates new revision inputs into its epistemic
state. Turning first to (i), we can describe Bel([ρ,N]) neatly with the help of a
function f , which takes as argument a non-empty sequence σ = (αm, . . . , α1) of
sentences, and returns a sentence. Basically, f (σ) is determined by first taking
α1 and then going backwards through σ, adding each sentence as we go, provided
that sentence is consistent with what has been collected so far (cf. the “linear
base-revision operation” of [15] and the “basic memory operator” of [9].)
Definition 1. Let σ = (αm, . . . , α1) be a sequence of sentences.
If m = 1 then f (σ) = α1.
If m > 1 then f (σ) =
{
αm ∧ f (αm−1, . . . , α1) if αm ∧ f (αm−1, . . . , α1) 6` ⊥
f (αm−1, . . . , α1) otherwise
The belief set associated to the state [ρ,N] is defined by Bel([ρ,N]) = f (ρ · N).
Hence, when calculating A’s beliefs from the sentences appearing in its epistemic
state, an agent gives highest priority to N. After that, it prioritises more recent
information received. Note that N is always believed, and that Bel([ρ,N]) is
inconsistent if and only if N is inconsistent.1
Example 1. Consider N = ¬p and ρ = (q, q → p). Bel([ρ,N]) = f (q, q → p,¬p).
In order to determine f (q, q → p,¬p) we need to know if q is consistent with
f (q → p,¬p). As f (¬p) = ¬p and q → p is consistent with ¬p, we have that
f (q → p,¬p) = (q → p) ∧ ¬p ≡ ¬q ∧ ¬p . So q is inconsistent with f (q → p,¬p).
Hence, f (q, q → p,¬p) = f (q → p,¬p) and Bel([ρ,N]) = f (q → p,¬p) ≡ ¬q∧¬p.
An agent incorporates a new revision input λ into its epistemic state [ρ,N]
by simply appending λ to ρ, i.e., the agent’s revision function ∗ is specified by
Definition 2. For every λ ∈ L, [ρ,N] ∗ λ = [ρ · λ,N].
Given this, we see that a new input λ will not always be believed in the new
state. Indeed (when N is consistent) it will be so only if it is consistent with
N. If it contradicts N, the agent’s belief set will remain unchanged (c.f.screened
revision [13]) although the input is incorporated into A’s epistemic state. Note
also that N remains unaffected by a revision input, i.e., ∗ is a core-invariant
revision operator [1].2 Core beliefs are needed to ensure that revision inputs can
be rejected. If they were not allowed, which corresponds to demanding N = > in
the above definitions, any consistent revision input would belong to the agent’s
beliefs.
As is shown in [1], the above revision method satisfies several natural prop-
erties. In particular, it stays largely faithful to the AGM postulates [7] (leaving
1 In [1], the core beliefs were always assumed to be consistent. This is a small but
important difference to framework assumed here.
2 In fact, the model of [1] allows the core itself to be revisable. We do not explore this
possibility here.
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aside the “success” postulate, which forces all new inputs to be believed), and
satisfies slight, “non-prioritised” variants of several postulates for iterated revi-
sion which have been proposed, including the well-known ones of Darwiche and
Pearl [5]. One characteristic property of this method is the following variant of
the rule “Recalcitrance” from [14]:
If N 6` (λ2 → ¬λ1) then Bel([ρ,N] ∗ λ1 ∗ λ2) ` λ1
This entails if the agent believes an input λ1, then it does so wholeheartedly, in
that the only way it can be dislodged from the belief set by a succeeding input
λ2 is if that input contradicts it given the core beliefs N.
If not explicitly stated otherwise, from now on we assume A’s epistemic state
is always of the form [ρ,N], and that A determines its belief set and incorporates
new inputs into its epistemic state as described above.
3 Explaining an observation
Suppose we make the observation o = 〈(φ1, . . . , φn), (θ1, . . . , θn), (D1, . . . , Dn)〉
about A. Consequently, after receiving the ith input φi, A’s epistemic state must
be [ρ · (φ1, . . . , φi),N] and its belief set f (ρ · (φ1, . . . , φi) · N), where [ρ,N] is A’s
unknown initial (i.e., before receiving φ1) epistemic state. Observation o now
amounts to the following:
f (ρ · (φ1, . . . , φi) · N) ` θi and
∀δ ∈ Di : f (ρ · (φ1, . . . , φi) · N) 6` δ i = 1, . . . , n (1)
We make the following definitions:
Definition 3. Let o = 〈(φ1, . . . , φn), (θ1, . . . , θn), (D1, . . . , Dn)〉 ∈ O±. Then
[ρ,N] explains o (or is an explanation for o) iff (1) above holds. We say N is an
o-acceptable core iff [ρ,N] explains o for some ρ.
Example 2. (i) The state [ρ,N] = [(p → q), r] explains 〈(p, q), (q, r), (∅, ∅)〉. As
required f (p→ q, p, r) ≡ p ∧ q ∧ r ` q and f (p→ q, p, q, r) ≡ p ∧ q ∧ r ` r.
(ii) [(p→ q),>] does not explain the observation 〈(p, q), (q, r), ({p}, ∅)〉. We have
f (p→ q, p>) ≡ p ∧ q which entails p. But according to this observation p is not
supposed to be believed after receiving p. Furthermore, f (p→ q, p, q,>) ≡ p∧ q
which does not entail r.
If we had some explanation [ρ,N] for o then we would be able to answer
the questions in the introduction: following a new input φn+1 A will believe
f (ρ · (φ1, . . . , φn, φn+1) · N), before receiving the first input A believes f (ρ · N),
and the beliefs after the ith input are f (ρ · (φ1, . . . , φi) · N). An obvious question
to ask is: are explanations guaranteed to exist for any given observation? The
next result goes some way to answering that question.
Proposition 1. Let o = 〈(φ1, . . . , φn), (θ1, . . . , θn), (D1, . . . , Dn)〉.
Then ⊥ is o-acceptable if and only if Di = ∅ for all i.
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For the setting in [2] where Di = ∅ for all i this means that there always
exists some explanation [ρ,N] for any such o, since the contradiction ⊥ is an o-
acceptable core using any ρ. But this would be a most unsatisfactory explanation,
since it means we just infer A believes everything at every step. In the more
general case, however, as soon as we know of a sentence that is not believed
after a revision step, we cannot guarantee the exisitence of an explanation. Of
course, this is because ⊥ entails anything. Nevertheless, an explanation [ρ,N]
might still exist and we can try to find it.
Example 3. A simple example for an observation that does not have an expla-
nation is 〈(p), (>), ({p,¬p})〉. It tells us that after receiving p, A was agnostic
about p. In particular it says p was not believed after receiving it. This means
that any o-acceptable core N for this o must be such that N ` ¬p. This in turn
means that any explanation [ρ,N] for this o yields f(ρ · p · N) ` ¬p, i.e., ¬p is
believed after receiving p. However, the observation tells us ¬p is not supposed
to be believed either.
Our job now is to choose, from the space of possible explanations for o,
the best one. As a guideline, we consider an explanation good if it only makes
necessary (or minimal) assumptions about what A believes. But how do we find
this best one? Our strategy is to split the problem into two parts, handling ρ and
N separately. First, (i) given a fixed o-acceptable core N, find a best sequence
ρ(o,N) such that [ρ,N] explains o, then, (ii) find a best o-acceptable core N(o).
Our best explanation for o will then be [ρ(o,N(o)),N(o)].
3.1 Finding ρ
Given o = 〈(φ1, . . . , φn), (θ1, . . . , θn), (D1, . . . , Dn)〉, let us assume a fixed core
N. To find that sequence ρ(o,N) such that [ρ(o,N),N] is the best explanation
for o, given N, we take inspiration from work done in the area of non-monotonic
reasoning on reasoning with conditional information.
Let’s say a pair (λ, χ) of sentences is a conditional belief in the state [ρ,N]
iff χ would be believed after revising [ρ,N] by λ, i.e., Bel([ρ,N] ∗ λ) ` χ. In this
case we will write λ ⇒[ρ,N] χ. The relation ⇒[ρ,N] almost satisfies all the rules
of a rational inference relation [12]. More precisely the modified version does,
viz., λ ⇒′[ρ,N] χ iff [N ` ¬λ or λ ⇒[ρ,N] χ]. This relation plays an important
role, because it turns out A’s beliefs following any sequence of revision inputs
starting from [ρ,N] is determined entirely by the set⇒[ρ,N] of conditional beliefs
in [ρ,N]. This is because, for any sequence of revision inputs φ1, . . . , φm, our
revision method satisfies
Bel([ρ,N] ∗ φ1 ∗ · · · ∗ φm) ≡ Bel([ρ,N] ∗ f(φ1, . . . , φm,N)).
Thus, as far as their effects on the belief set go, a sequence of revision inputs
starting from [ρ,N] can always be reduced to a single input. (But note the set
of conditional beliefs ⇒[ρ,N]∗λ in the state [ρ,N] ∗ λ following revision by λ will
generally not be the same as ⇒[ρ,N].)
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All this means observation o – not yet taking the Di into account – may be
translated into a partial description of the set of conditional beliefs that A has
in its initial epistemic state:
CN(o) = {f (φ1, . . . , φi,N)⇒ θi | i = 1, . . . , n}.
However, the observation contains more information. From the Di we can
also extract a set of conditionals we do not want to be part of the agent’s initial
epistemic state. We call them negative conditionals. If one of these conditionals
did hold in the initial state, this state would not be an explanation for o.
NN(o) = {f (φ1, . . . , φi,N)⇒ δ | i = 1, . . . , n ∧ δ ∈ Di}.
Clearly, if we had access to the complete set of A’s conditional beliefs in
its initial state, this would give another way to answer the questions of the
introduction. Now, the problem of determining which conditional beliefs follow
from a given set C of such (positive conditional) beliefs has been well-studied and
several solutions have been proposed, e.g., [8,10]. One particularly elegant and
well-motivated solution is to take the rational closure of C [12]. Furthermore,
as is shown in, e.g., [6], this construction is amenable to a relatively simple
representation as a sequence of sentences! Our idea is essentially to take ρ(o,N)
to be this sequence corresponding to the rational closure of CN(o). For the case
o ∈ O, this is what was done in [2]. However, allowing non-empty Di complicates
matters slightly. These constructions cannot guarantee that none of the negative
conditionals in NN(o) follow from CN(o), i.e. they do not incorporate negative
information. This generalisation was introduced in [3] and will be illustrated in
the next section.
The rational closure for both positive and negative conditionals
Given a set of conditionals C = {λi ⇒ χi | i = 1, . . . , l} we denote by
C˜ = {λi → χi | i = 1, . . . , l} the set of material counterparts of all the condition-
als in C.
We define two types of exceptionality of a conditional λ⇒ χ with respect to
a set of sentences U , one for positive and one for negative conditionals.
Definition 4. A conditional λ⇒ χ is
– p-exceptional for a set of sentences U iff U ` ¬λ.
– n-exceptional for U iff U ∪ {λ} ` χ.
The intuition is as follows, a conditional is p-exceptional for U if it is not pos-
sible to consistently add its antecedent to the set of sentences. It is n-exceptional
if adding the antecedent to U will make the consequent inferable – for a negative
conditional this is exactly what is not wanted.
Now assume we are given a set C of positive conditionals and a set N of
negative ones. The rational closure ρR(C,N ) of C and N is determined as fol-
lows. We define two decreasing sets of conditionals C0 ⊇ C1 ⊇ · · · ⊇ Cm and
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N0 ⊇ N1 ⊇ · · · ⊇ Nm and a decreasing set of sentences U0 ⊇ U1 ⊇ · · · ⊇ Um –
the Ui will be defined via a least fix-point (lfp) construction. Those sets have
to satisfy the following conditions:
1. C0 = C and N0 = N
2. Ui = C˜i ∪ lfp ({¬λ | λ⇒ χ ∈ Ni ∧ λ⇒ χ is n-exeptional for Ui})
3. Ci+1 is the set of conditionals in Ci that are p-exceptional for Ui and
Ni+1 is the set of conditionals in Ni that are n-exceptional for Ui
4. m is minimal such that Cm = Cm+1 and Nm = Nm+1
Then we set3
ρR(C,N ) = (
∧
Um,
∧
Um−1, . . . ,
∧
U0).
The calculation of Ui starts off with C˜i and then adds negated antecedents
of conditionals in Ni that are n-exceptional for the growing Ui.
We remark that for N = ∅ the entire construction reduces to the original
rational closure construction of [6,12], utilised in [2]. This is because Ui = C˜i for
all i, as there are no conditionals that could be n-exceptional.
To get an intuition of what the Ui mean, let us take a look at how ρR(C,N )
will be used and what happens during the calculation. First note that ρR(C,N )
is a logical chain with the logically strongest sentence at the right-hand end. It
will be used as the sequence part ρ in the epistemic state [ρ,N] of an agent. In the
calculation of the belief set using f (·) after the ith revision step before processing
ρR(C,N ), f (φ1, . . . , φi,N) will have been collected. Note that this corresponds
to the antecedent of at least one conditional. The processing of ρR(C,N ) then
reduces to the choice of exactly one Uj – the first one to be consistent with
f (φ1, . . . , φi,N). This is because the ones with greater index are inconsistent
with f (φ1, . . . , φi,N) while the ones with smaller index are all entailed by Uj .
Any Ui basically contains all the positive conditionals (or rather the cor-
responding implications) that still need to be satisfied (so U0 contains all of
them).4
We now have to find out which positive conditionals are satisfied at the
current stage and which have to be dealt with later on. It does not suffice to
check that the antecedent λ of a positive conditional (λ⇒ χ) can be consistently
added (which then gives us the desired consequent). It is possible that adding
that λ also makes the consequent of a negative conditional inferable, which is
not wanted. So we have to make sure that in this case λ cannot be consistently
added. We do so by adding ¬λ to Ui. This addition, however, can have an effect
3 We define
V ∅ to be the tautology.
4 Informally, a positive conditional is satisfied by Ui if its antecedent can be consis-
tently added to Ui yielding the desired consequent – which usually is ensured as the
material counterpart of the conditional belongs to Ui – without contradicting the
negative information in the observation. This means a conditional not satisfied by
Ui still needs to be dealt with by a later Uj otherwise the epistemic state cannot be
an explanation.
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on other negative conditionals, so we check all of them again until Ui does not
change anymore. With Ui now settled, we can determine which conditionals still
need to be dealt with, i.e. which were still not yet satisfied by Ui and have to be
satisfied by Ui+1 or even later.
Writing αi for
∧
Ui, this construction defines the relation⇒R given by λ⇒R
χ iff either αm ` ¬λ or
[
αj ∧λ ` χ where j is minimal such that αj 6` ¬λ
]
. Since
αm a · · · a α0 it easy to check that in fact this second disjunct is equivalent to
f (αm, . . . , α0, λ) ` χ.
We now make the following definition:
Definition 5. Let o ∈ O± and N ∈ L. We call ρR(CN(o),NN(o)) the rational
prefix of o with respect to N, and will denote it by ρR(o,N).
Example 4. Let o = 〈(p, q), (r,¬p), ({p}, ∅)〉 and N = ¬p. Then
CN(o) = {f (p,¬p)⇒ r, f (p, q,¬p)⇒ ¬p}
= {¬p⇒ r, (q ∧ ¬p)⇒ ¬p}
= C0
NN(o) = {¬p⇒ p}
= N0
U0 = C˜0 = {¬p→ r,¬p∧ q → ¬p}. This is because the only negative conditional
is not n-exceptional with respect to this set. Since neither of the individual
conditionals in C0 is p-exceptional for U0 we get that C1 = ∅. Also N1 = ∅ as the
negative conditional is not n-exceptional for U0. Clearly, then also C2 = ∅ = C1
and N2 = ∅ = N1, so we obtain ρR(o,N) = (
∧ ∅,∧U0) . Rewriting the sequence
using logically equivalent sentences we get ρR(o,N) = (>,¬p→ r).
Now, an interesting thing to note about the rational prefix construction is
that it actually goes through independently of whether N is o-acceptable. In fact
a useful side-effect of the construction is that it actually reveals whether N is
o-acceptable. For N ≡ ⊥ Proposition 1 tells us if N is o-acceptable – if Di = ∅
for all i, then N is o-acceptable, otherwise it is not. For N 6≡ ⊥, given we have
constructed ρR(o,N) = (αm, . . . , α0), all we have to do is to look at sentence αm
and check if it is a tautology:
Proposition 2. Let ρR(o,N) = (αm, . . . , α0) be the rational prefix for o ∈ O±
and N ∈ L such that N 6≡ ⊥. Then
(i) if αm ≡ > then [ρR(o,N),N] is an explanation for o.
(ii) if αm 6≡ > then N is not an o-acceptable core.
Thus these propositions give us a necessary and sufficient condition for N to
be an o-acceptable core. This will be used in the algorithm of Section 3.3.
In Example 4 ρR(o,N) = (>,¬p→ r) was calculated. The above proposition
implies that [(>,¬p→ r),¬p] explains o = 〈(p, q), (r,¬p), ({p}, ∅)〉. This is veri-
fied by f (>,¬p→ r, p,¬p) ≡ ¬p∧r ` r, f (>,¬p→ r, p, q,¬p) ≡ ¬p∧q∧r ` ¬p,
and f (>,¬p→ r, p,¬p) ≡ ¬p ∧ r 6` p.
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Justification for using the rational prefix
Given some o-acceptable core belief N there will be several sequences σ, such
that [σ,N] explains o. So, the question is why we should choose ρR(o,N) rather
than any other of those sequences. In [2] we gave an answer to that question for
the case that o ∈ O, i.e. there was no information about what was not believed
after a revision step.
We did so by comparing the belief traces of the possible solutions. The be-
lief trace of a state [σ,N] is the sequence of sentences (Belσ0 , Belσ1 , . . . , Belσn),
where Belσi is defined to be the beliefs after the i
th input in o. In other words
Belσi = f (σ · (φ1, . . . , φi) · N) . So Belσ0 gives the initial belief set.
Example 5. Let o, N and ρR(o,N) be as in Example 4. Then the belief trace is
(¬p ∧ r,¬p ∧ r,¬p ∧ q ∧ r).
Given any two possible belief traces (β0, . . . , βn) and (γ0, . . . , γn), let us write
(β0, . . . , βn) ≤lex (γ0, . . . , γn) iff, for all i = 0, . . . , n,
[
βj ≡ γj for all j < i implies
γi ` βi
]
. Elements lower down in the ordering are considered better. So, we look
at the initial beliefs first. If one trace has a logically weaker initial belief than
another trace, the former is preferred. If the initial beliefs are equivalent, we go on
to the beliefs after the first revision step. Again, the trace with the weaker belief
there is preferred, and so on. This preference relation between traces naturally
defines a preference relation between the sequences σ that explain an observation
o given a fixed o-acceptable core.
It turns out that the rational prefix gives rise to a belief trace that is at
least as preferred (using this preference relation) as the belief trace of any other
solution. Furthermore, among the most preferred solutions the rational prefix
will predict the logically weakest belief after a further revision no matter what
the input is. Whether the same or a similar result holds for the more general
case considered in this paper, is still under investigation.
3.2 Minimising N
In this section, we will restrict our attention to those observations o ∈ O± that
have an o-acceptable core and we will denote this set of observations by O±. 5
Core beliefs are needed to allow non-prioritised revision, but at the same time
we try to minimise the assumptions about the agent’s beliefs. This includes
minimising N. The first idea would be to simply take the disjunction of all
possible o-acceptable cores, i.e., to take N∨(o), defined by
Definition 6. N∨(o) ≡
∨{N | N is an o-acceptable core}.
But is N∨(o) itself o-acceptable? Thankfully the answer is yes, a result which
follows (in our finite setting) from the following proposition which says that the
family of o-acceptable cores is closed under disjunctions.
5 Note, that it makes no sense to try and identify a best solution if there is none.
Further, recall that every observation without negative information has a solution,
i.e. O ⊂ O±.
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Proposition 3. If N1 and N2 are o-acceptable then so is N1 ∨ N2.
So as a corollary N∨(o) does indeed satisfy:
(Acceptability) N(o) is an o-acceptable core
What other properties does N∨(o) satisfy? Clearly, N∨(o) will always be consis-
tent provided at least one consistent o-acceptable core exists:
(Consistency) If N(o) ≡ ⊥ then N′ ≡ ⊥ for every o-acceptable core N′.
Acceptability and Consistency would appear to be absolute rock-bottom prop-
erties which we would expect of any method for finding a good o-acceptable
core. However for N∨ we can say more. Given two observations o = 〈ι, τ,D〉
and o′ = 〈ι′, τ ′, D′〉, let us denote by o · o′ the concatenation of o and o′, i.e.,
o ·o′ = 〈ι · ι′, τ · τ ′, D ·D′〉. We shall use o vright o′ to denote that o′ right extends
o, i.e., o′ = o · o′′ for some (possibly empty) o′′ ∈ O±, and o vleft o′ to denote o′
left extends o, i.e., o′ = o′′ · o for some (possibly empty) o′′ ∈ O±.
Proposition 4. Suppose o vright o′ or o vleft o′. Then every o′-acceptable core
is an o-acceptable core.
As a result of this we see N∨ satisfies the following two properties, which say
extending the observation into the future or past leads only to a logically stronger
core being returned.
(Right Monotony) If o vright o′ then N(o′) ` N(o)
(Left Monotony) If o vleft o′ then N(o′) ` N(o).
Right- and Left Monotony provide ways of expressing that N(o) leads only to
safe conclusions that something is a core belief of A – conclusions that cannot be
“defeated” by additional information about A that might come along in the form
of observations prior to, or after o. As pointed out in [2], it is not the case that
by inserting any observation anywhere in o, N∨ will always lead to a logically
stronger core. Intuitively, an intermediate input can possibly explain a change
in the belief set that would have to be attributed to the core belief, otherwise.
It turns out the above four properties are enough to actually characterise N∨.
In fact, given the first two, just one of Right- and Left Monotony is sufficient for
this task:
Proposition 5. Let N : O±→ L be any function which returns a sentence given
any o ∈ O±. Then the following are equivalent:
(i) N satisfies Acceptability, Consistency and Right Monotony.
(ii) N satisfies Acceptability, Consistency and Left Monotony.
(iii) N(o) ≡ N∨(o) for all o ∈ O±.
Note that as a corollary to this proposition we get the surprising result that, in
the presence of Acceptability and Consistency, Right- and Left Monotony are in
fact equivalent.
Combining the findings of the last two sections, we are now ready to announce
our candidate for the best explanation for o. By analogy with “rational closure”,
we make the following definition:
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Definition 7. Let o ∈ O± be an observation. Then we call [ρR(o,N∨(o)),N∨(o)]
the rational explanation for o.
But how might we find it in practice? The next section gives an algorithm for
just that.
3.3 Constructing the Rational Explanation
The idea behind the algorithm is as follows. Given an observation o, we start
with the weakest possible core N0 = > and construct the corresponding rational
prefix (αm, . . . , α0)=ρ0 of o with respect to N0. We then check whether αm is a
tautology. If it is then we know by Proposition 2 that [ρ0,N0] is an explanation
for o and so we stop and return this as output. If it isn’t then Proposition 2
tells us N0 cannot be o-acceptable. In this case, we modify N0 by conjoining αm
to it, i.e., by setting N1 = N0 ∧ αm. Constructing the rational prefix of o with
respect to the new core then leads to a different prefix, which can be dealt with
the same way.
Algorithm 1 Calculation of the rational explanation
Input: observation o = 〈(φ1, . . . , φn), (θ1, . . . , θn), (D1, . . . , Dn)〉
Output: the rational explanation for o
N⇐ >
repeat
ρ⇐ ρR(o,N) {ρ = (αm, . . . , α0)}
N⇐ N ∧ αm
until αm ≡ >
Return If N ≡ ⊥ and ∃i : Di 6= ∅ then “no explanation”, [ρ,N] otherwise
Before showing that the output of this algorithm is the correct one, we need
to be sure it always terminates. This is a consequence of the following:
Lemma 1. Let N and αm be as after the calculation of ρR(o,N) in the repeat
loop of the algorithm. If αm 6≡ > then N 6≡ N ∧ αm.
This result assures us that if the termination condition of the algorithm does not
hold, the new core will be strictly logically stronger than the previous one. Thus
the cores generated by the algorithm become progressively strictly stronger. In
our setting, in which we assumed a finite propositional language, this means, in
the worst case, the process will continue until N ≡ ⊥. However in this case it
can be shown the rational prefix of o with respect to ⊥ is just (>), and so the
termination condition will be satisfied at the very next step.
Now we turn to the correctness of the output of the algorithm. Assume there
is no explanation for o. Then in this case the algorithm will terminate returning
an inconsistent core N. This is because if the returned N was consistent we
would have calculated an explanation – note that αm ≡ >, as otherwise the
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algorithm would not have terminated, hence by Proposition 2 [ρR(o,N),N] is an
explanation for o, contradicting the assumption there is none. Also, Proposition
1 tells us there must be a non-empty Di. Hence if no explanation exists the
algorithm correctly tells us so.
Now assume there is an explanation for o. To show the output matches
the rational explanation, consider the sequence [ρ0,N0], . . . , [ρk,Nk] of epistemic
states generated by the algorithm. We need to show Nk ≡ N∨(o). The direction
Nk ` N∨(o) follows from the fact that [ρk,Nk] is an explanation for o and so Nk is
an o-acceptable core. The converse N∨(o) ` Nk is proved by showing inductively
that N∨(o) ` Ni for each i = 0, . . . , k: the case i = 0 clearly holds since N0 ≡ >.
The inductive step uses the following property:
Lemma 2. Let 0 < i ≤ k and suppose ρi−1 = (αm, . . . , α0). Then, for any
o-acceptable core N′: if N′ ` Ni−1 then N′ ` αm.
This enables us to prove that, given N∨(o) ` Ni−1, we must also have N∨(o) ` Ni.
Thus N∨(o) ` Nk as required. Since obviously ρk is the rational prefix of o with
respect to Nk by construction, we have:
Proposition 6. Given input observation o, the algorithm outputs the rational
explanation for o, if an explanation for o exists. If no explanation exists it outputs
“no explanation”.
3.4 An Example
Let o = 〈(p, q, r), (s,>,¬q), (∅, {s}, ∅)〉. So o is saying that after A receives p
then it believes s. Then, receiving q leads A to drop this belief in s. Finally,
after receiving r, A believes ¬q.
The calculation of the rational explanation starts off with the core N = >,
so our conditionals have the antecedents f (p · >) ≡ p, f (p · q · >) ≡ p ∧ q, and
f (p · q · r · >) ≡ p ∧ q ∧ r. We get
C0 = CN(o) = {p⇒ s, p ∧ q ⇒ >, p ∧ q ∧ r ⇒ ¬q}
N0 = NN(o) = {p ∧ q ⇒ s}
By construction C˜0 ⊆ U0 and as p ∧ q ⇒ s is n-exceptional for U0, ¬(p ∧ q)
has to be added as well. Hence
U0 = {p→ s, p ∧ q → >, p ∧ q ∧ r → ¬q,¬(p ∧ q)}
Of the positive conditionals only p⇒ s is not p-exceptional for U0, p∧ q ⇒ s
is still n-exceptional for U0, so
C1 = {p ∧ q ⇒ >, p ∧ q ∧ r ⇒ ¬q}
N1 = {p ∧ q ⇒ s}
This time U1 = C˜1 = {p ∧ q → >, p ∧ q ∧ r → ¬q} as adding p ∧ q does not
make s inferable, anymore. Only p∧ q ∧ r ⇒ ¬q is exceptional for U1. Note that
adding p∧q to U1 does not make s inferable. In fact p∧q∧r ⇒ ¬q is exceptional
for itself because p ∧ q ∧ r is inconsistent with p ∧ q ∧ r → ¬q. So we have
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C2 = {p ∧ q ∧ r ⇒ ¬q} = C3
N2 = ∅ = N3
U2 = {p ∧ q ∧ r → ¬q} = U3
As αm = α2 6≡ >, we know, that N = > is not o-acceptable and has to
be adapted. The new core is the old one conjoined with α2, so the new core is
¬p ∨ ¬q ∨ ¬r. This means, that we get the following sets of conditionals.
C0 = CN(o) = {p ∧ (¬q ∨ ¬r)⇒ s, p ∧ q ∧ ¬r ⇒ >,¬p ∧ q ∧ r ⇒ ¬q}
N0 = NN(o) = {p ∧ q ∧ ¬r ⇒ s}
As in the first run the negative conditional is n-exceptional, so
U0 = {p ∧ (¬q ∨ ¬r)→ s, p ∧ q ∧ ¬r → >,¬p ∧ q ∧ r → ¬q,¬(p ∧ q ∧ ¬r)}
C1 = {p ∧ q ∧ ¬r ⇒ >,¬p ∧ q ∧ r ⇒ ¬q}
N1 = {p ∧ q ∧ ¬r ⇒ s}
U1 = {p ∧ q ∧ ¬r → >,¬p ∧ q ∧ r → ¬q}
C2 = C3 = {¬p ∧ q ∧ r ⇒ ¬q}
N2 = N3 = ∅
U2 = U3 = {¬p ∧ q ∧ r → ¬q}
Again αm 6≡ >, so N has to be adapted once more. Conjoining the old one
with αm leads to a core that is equivalent to ¬q∨¬r, so this time the conditionals
look as follows
C0 = CN(o) = {p ∧ (¬q ∨ ¬r)⇒ s, p ∧ q ∧ ¬r ⇒ >, p ∧ ¬q ∧ r ⇒ ¬q}
N0 = NN(o) = {p ∧ q ∧ ¬r ⇒ s}
The n-exceptionality of p ∧ q ∧ ¬r ⇒ s is easily verified, so that
U0 = {p ∧ (¬q ∨ ¬r)→ s, p ∧ q ∧ ¬r → >, p ∧ ¬q ∧ r → ¬q,¬(p ∧ q ∧ ¬r)}
None of the positive conditionals is p-exceptional for U0, but p ∧ q ∧ ¬r ⇒ s
is n-exceptional. So we get
C1 = ∅
N1 = {p ∧ q ∧ ¬r ⇒ s}
U1 = ∅
C2 = C3 = ∅
N2 = N3 = ∅
U2 = U3 = ∅
Now, we are done as αm = > and as N 6≡ ⊥, we indeed have an explanation:
[σ,N] = [(>, (p ∧ (¬q ∨ ¬r)→ s) ∧ (¬p ∨ ¬q ∨ r)) ,¬q ∨ ¬r]
Let us verify, that o = 〈(p, q, r), (s,>,¬q), (∅, {s}, ∅)〉 is indeed explained by
[σ,N].6 We do so by calculating the belief trace, omitting Belσ0 .
(Belσ1 , Bel
σ
2 , Bel
σ
3 ) = (p ∧ ¬q ∧ s, p ∧ q ∧ ¬r, p ∧ ¬q ∧ r ∧ s)
6 As we know the core N to hold at each step, we can simplify the belief state to
[(>, (p→ s) ∧ (¬p ∨ ¬q)),¬q ∨ ¬r] and get Belσ0 = (¬p ∨ s) ∧ (¬p ∨ ¬q) ∧ (¬q ∨ ¬r)
as the beliefs the agent held before receiving any input.
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We see that, indeed, s is believed after receiving p, and not believed anymore
after then receiving q. After receiving the last input r, ¬q is believed.
In fact, if we look at the observation it is clear that N has to entail at least
¬q ∨ ¬r. If it did not, it would not be possible to keep q out of the belief set
when constructing it for the case after incorporating r into the epistemic state.
However, q has to be kept out, as A believes ¬q after receiving r. The revision
operator assumed in this paper satisfies the AGM-postulates (given an input
does not contradict the core belief). Hence, it is reasonable that after the first
revision step ¬q is believed. If q was consistent with the belief set at that stage,
the revision would simply have to add q. But then s would still have to be
believed after revising with q, which it is not. In other words, in order for s to
be dropped from the belief set, q has to contradict it. A core belief is not needed
in this case (in contrast to the one involving q and r), because nothing in the
observation prevents us from assuming that p is still believed after receiving q.
The same argument supports that ¬r must be believed after receiving q, because
the belief set does not simply expand after receiving r in the next step.
So far, we have justified the core belief, all of Belσ1 (input p believed, ¬q
as argued above, s forced by the observation), all of Belσ2 (no reason why p
would have to be dropped, input q accepted, ¬r as argued above, s not believed
anymore as forced by the observation), and most of Belσ3 (no reason why p
would have to be dropped, ¬q as forced by the observation, input r believed). It
remains to explain, why s reappears in the belief set.
The observation indicates that p is a reason to believe s and it implies that q
is a (stronger) reason not to believe s. After receiving r the reason not to believe
s is gone, while the reason for believing s remains. So it seems plausible to infer
that s is indeed believed. Note, that if p is not a reason to believe s, it would
have to be believed even before p arrived. In this case it would still make sense
to assume s to be believed in the end, because for all we know q is the only
reason for s not to be believed.
4 Discussion
In this section, we briefly want to discuss some limitations of our approach and
comment on a few issues that came up during the Dagstuhl seminar.
4.1 Core constraints
We motivated the use of core beliefs by the need for non-prioritised revision.
However, core beliefs do more than block certain inputs from being believed –
they cause the negations of these inputs to be believed. This is much stronger
than just not believing an input. As a consequence, the agent cannot remain
agnostic about a sentence. Consider the following observation which basically
says that the agent received p followed by ¬p as inputs, but did not believe
either: o = 〈(p,¬p), (>,>), ({p}, {¬p})〉.
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The belief revision framework assumed in this paper forces us to assign an
inconsistent N to the agent, which of course does not explain the observation.
There is a rather natural generalisation of the framework that prevents this
problem. Rather than assuming a core belief – a sentence the agent will always
commit to, we allow the agent to have core constraints – sentences it wants to
remain consistent with, i.e. A will not believe their negations.
The reason to allow several sentences and not just one is the same as for
generalising the observations allowing sets of sentences not to be believed. A
single sentence would not allow agnosticism.
Let σ = (αm, . . . , α1) be a sequence of sentences and CC the set of core
constraints. These two components now make up the epistemic state of an agent.
f (·, ·) is the function that calculates the sentence corresponding to the beliefs of
an agent and is defined inductively on the length of σ as follows:
f ((), CC) = >
f (σ,CC) =
{
ϕ = αm ∧ f (αm−1, . . . , α1, CC) if ∀ψ ∈ CC : ϕ ∧ ψ 6` ⊥
f (αm−1, . . . , α1, CC) otherwise
We remark that this definition still allows the belief set of an agent to be
inconsistent. This is possible if CC = ∅. This fact shows that core constraints
are indeed a generalisation of core beliefs. For every epistemic state [σ,N] using
core beliefs there is one using core constraints that behaves equivalently, i.e. the
two yield the same belief sets, even after an arbitrary sequence of revisions.7
Abusing notation, [σ,N] can be represented by [σ · N, {N}] if N is consistent, and
by [(N), ∅] if N is inconsistent. The singleton core constraint makes sure that
after all revision steps the agent remains consistent with what earlier was the
core belief, so that the corresponding sentence can be added when it comes to
its initial sequence of beliefs.
This shows that the new framework can explain all observations the original
belief revision framework could, however it can also explain the above obser-
vation o = 〈(p,¬p), (>,>), ({p}, {¬p})〉. [(), {p,¬p}], causes both inputs to be
rejected as incorporating them would cause an inconsistency with individual core
constraints.8 Hence, this approach would be strictly more general. That is the
good news. The bad news is that, so far, we were not able to transfer any of our
results to this framework. Although we have an idea of how the weakening (anal-
ogous to the construction in Section 3.2) of two sets of core constraints might
be, it is far from obvious how it can be proved that the weakened constraints
provide a solution, as well. The problem is that the proofs would require exten-
sive reasoning with and inferring from what is not believed by the agent, i.e.
drawing conclusions from non-entailment of a set of sentences. One possibility
to attack this problem might be to incorporate the notion of not believing into
the object language, e.g. by using a logic for disbeliefs ([4,16]).
7 Of course, we assume here that revision is again defined by [ρ, CC] ∗λ = [ρ · λ,CC].
8 Similarly, the observation o = 〈(p), (>), ({p,¬p})〉 from Example 3 can now be ex-
plained by [(), {¬p}].
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4.2 In defense of the belief revision framework assumed and
temporal aspects
During the Dagstuhl seminar on belief change in rational agents some points
regarding belief revision in general and the assumptions in our work in particular
were brought up. Some of them deserve discussion here.
Often it is not clear (or not clearly specified) what a new piece of information
actually represents. If it is a piece of new or modified background knowledge of
the world, it should be allowed to modify the agent’s internal structure. If it is
merely an observation about the current state of the world that impact might
not be wanted. It would suffice to use it to enrich conclusions that the agent can
draw from its background knowledge. If the information is of the second type
then iterated revision seems not to be necessary. Further, it does not make sense
that the incoming information can be contradictory.
In fact, core beliefs can be interpreted as knowledge of the world the agent
possesses. The original framework in [1] distinguishes between two revision func-
tions, one for core beliefs and one for regular ones. In this respect, it allows the
input to be of both types. So the implicit assumption in our studies is, that the
inputs received by the agent are mere observations about the world and our job
is to identify which world knowledge (N) the agent possesses and which prior
observations (ρ) it has made.
It might be interesting to investigate the question of not only reconstructing
the agent’s initial epistemic state but also make a justified guess about the type
of revision an input has caused. By default it could be of the second type but in
some cases assuming that the input changed the core beliefs might allow a more
satisfactory explanation.
The claim that iterated revision is not necessary for regular inputs is based
on the following argument. Rather than incorporating each piece of evidence at
a time, it is more rational to collect all evidence, select the relevant and reliable
pieces and then incorporate them at once. This is what is ideally done in legal
cases. If we assume all the sources to be faithful to the real state of the world, all
pieces of evidence had to be consistent. But this assumption is far from realistic.
Even in the case of only one source, sensors might be noisy and give different
information at different times (although the world did not change).
Our framework indeed carries out a selection of inputs at each point of time.
We agree that a preference based solely on recency of information is not the
most realistic one. However, the raw data we have does not provide any other
information on which inputs should be preferred. Further, recency of information
can be argued to be an indicator of reliability. More time and effort has been
spent into investigating the status of a sentence.
In general the following can be said. The temporal aspect might not have the
primary impact on the overall reliability of a piece of information, but it still is
highly relevant to what was believed at which point of time. This is because an
agent can only select from information that has been received up to that point
of time.
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4.3 Conclusion
In this paper, we generalised previous work on reconstructing an agent’s epis-
temic state from observations by allowing further information to be incorporated.
In addition to information about what the agent believed after revising by cer-
tain inputs, the present approach allows processing information about what the
agent did not believe, as well. The model of the agent remained the same, but
the calculation of the initial belief state was generalised. Most of the results
carry over the setting presented here. Whether the minimality property we gave
as justification for the rational prefix in the special case (cf. Section 3.1) holds
as well is subject to further investigation.
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